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OPINION OF THE COURT
__________

RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Michele Wendel is a former employee of ScheringPlough who participated in the Schering-Plough Corporation
Employees’ Savings Plan, a defined contribution savings plan
sponsored by Schering-Plough. Wendel and two other former
Schering-Plough employees brought a class action against
Schering-Plough and certain of its officers and directors under
ERISA § 502(a)(2) arising out of the offering and management
of the Plan. The two other plaintiffs were dismissed by
stipulation in 2006 and Wendel is now the sole class
representative. The District Court concluded that a release
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Wendel signed in connection with her separation from ScheringPlough violated ERISA and was therefore void. It then found
the requirements of Rule 23 to be satisfied and certified a class
consisting of Plan investors. On appeal, a host of issues relating
to ERISA, Wendel’s release, and class certification are before
us. We will vacate the order certifying the class and remand for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
The Schering-Plough Corporation Employees’ Savings
Plan is an “individual account plan” under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461. The Plan allows participants to choose among a
variety of investment funds, including the Schering-Plough
Stock Fund, and to contribute as much as 50% of their pre-tax
compensation to one or more of these funds. As the name
suggests, the Schering-Plough Stock Fund is comprised
primarily of shares of Schering-Plough common stock. It was
one of fourteen funds offered by the company as investment
options for the employees’ pension contribution. The value of
Schering-Plough common stock declined during fiscal years
2001 and 2002, falling from a high of $60 per share to a low of
below $20 per share in June 2003. Wendel alleges that this
decline was the result of Schering-Plough’s violations of Food
and Drug Administration (“FDA”) regulations, delays in FDA
approval of new products, and Schering-Plough’s participation
in illegal kickback schemes.
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Initially, three plaintiffs, Jingdong Zhu, Adrian Fields,
and Michele Wendel, filed a class action under ERISA § 409(a)1
asserting four claims of breach of fiduciary duty against
numerous defendants2 based on facts relating to this decline in
value. Their complaint asserted claims on behalf of the Plan
under ERISA § 502(a)(2) 3 and sought to restore losses sustained

1

Liability for a fiduciary’s breach of duty is established by
ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a), which provides: “Any
person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches
any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon
fiduciaries by this subchapter shall be personally liable to make
good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from such
breach.”
2

The defendants are (1) Schering-Plough Corporation
(“Schering-Plough”), as sponsor of the Plan; (2) ScheringPlough’s former CEO, Richard J. Kogan, and individual
members of the Schering-Plough Board’s Pension Committee
(collectively, the “Director Defendants”); (3) Schering-Plough’s
Employee Benefits Committee and its members (collectively,
the “Benefits Committee”); and (4) Schering-Plough’s
Employee Benefits Investment Committee and its members
(collectively, the “Investment Committee”).
3

Section 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(2), provides for civil
enforcement of ERISA’s fiduciary provisions “by a participant,
beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate relief under [ERISA
§ 409].”
-7-

by the Plan as a result of defendants’ breaches of their fiduciary
obligations. Zhu and Fields are no longer parties.
On July 20, 2000, after ten years of employment with
Schering-Plough, Wendel entered into a Separation Agreement
that included an enhanced severance package (specifically, an
additional severance payment of $13,943.60) in consideration
for a general release and a covenant not to sue the company.4
Because Wendel is the sole remaining class representative, one
of the central issues we must consider is what effect, if any,
Wendel’s release and covenant not to sue have on her ability to

4

Wendel’s Separation Agreement provides, in pertinent part:
In exchange for the “enhanced” severance
payment, I release the Company (which includes
Schering-Plough, and all of its subsidiaries,
affiliates, officers, directors, and employees) from
all claims and liabilities which I have or may have
against it as of the date on which I sign this
Agreement . . . . Furthermore, I promise that I
will not file a lawsuit against the Company in
connection with any aspect of my employment or
termination. I also waive the right to all remedies
in any such action that may be brought on my
behalf.

(Joint App. 331.)
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bring this action under ERISA § 502(a)(2) and to represent the
class in accord with Rule 23.
Wendel pursues three claims stemming from defendants’
alleged role in and knowledge of the alleged causes of the
decline in the value of Schering-Plough stock, and from
defendants’ decision to continue to maintain the Plan’s
significant investment in Schering-Plough stock and to offer the
Schering-Plough Stock Fund as an investment option despite
this knowledge.5 Wendel alleges that, since 1998, defendants
knew or should have known that Schering-Plough stock was
overvalued and an imprudent investment because of undisclosed
problems with its FDA compliance systems and because of
expected delays in rolling out its anticipated “blockbuster” drug,
Clarinex. Wendel alleges that Schering-Plough disclosed these
problems in a press release in 2001, immediately after which
shares fell 15% in heavy trading and analysts dropped ratings
and projected earnings for the company. She further alleges that
defendants knew or should have known that Schering-Plough
was engaged in illegal kickbacks and fraud against the
Government, which ultimately resulted in substantial settlement

5

The complaint asserted four counts. The District Court
concluded that Rule 23 could not be satisfied as to one count
that was based on the alleged failure to disclose information,
because questions pertaining to individual reliance rendered a
class action inappropriate as to that count. Wendel did not
cross-appeal on this issue.
-9-

payments by the company. Finally, Wendel alleges that the
decline in the value of Schering-Plough common stock was a
result of these problems, causing the Plan to suffer tens of
millions of dollars in losses.
Wendel makes three breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims
based on these facts. First, she alleges that defendants failed to
prudently and loyally manage the Plan’s assets. Second, Wendel
alleges that Schering-Plough, the Director Defendants, and the
Benefits Committee Defendants failed to adequately monitor
and inform the appointed fiduciaries, the Investment Committee
Defendants. Third, she alleges that defendants breached their
fiduciary duty to avoid conflicts of interest, which prevented
defendants from acting exclusively in the best interests of the
Plan participants and beneficiaries.
Wendel moved for class certification pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(a) and either 23(b)(1) or 23(b)(2). The proposed
class included all participants and beneficiaries of the Plan since
July 29, 1998. The District Court decided, as an initial matter,
that the release executed by Wendel was void under ERISA
§ 410(a) because it relieved fiduciaries of their obligations.
Therefore, the impact of her release on the class certification
issue was not considered. The District Court concluded that
class certification was appropriate for all three of the above
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claims under Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(1)(B).6 The District
Court defined the class as “[a]ll persons who were participants
in or beneficiaries of the Schering-Plough Corporations
Employees’ Savings Plan at any time between July 29, 1998 to
the present and whose accounts included investments in
Schering stock.” (Joint App. 35.) In so doing, the District Court
adopted and incorporated the Report and Recommendation of
Magistrate Judge Falk, in addition to offering its own opinion.
(Joint App. 35.) Defendants petitioned for leave to appeal the
class certification decision on an interlocutory basis pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f). We granted defendants’ petition for an
interlocutory appeal.7
II.
As noted above, Wendel is now the sole representative of
the class, and she signed a Separation Agreement with ScheringPlough that includes both a release and a covenant not to sue.
As the existence of her release has been a focus of the parties’
arguments, we first confront two preliminary issues regarding
her release: (1) was the District Court correct in concluding that

6

Having so found, the District Court did not consider whether
they satisfied Rule 23(b)(2).
7

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331
and 1337. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) and
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f).
- 11 -

ERISA § 410(a) renders the release and the covenant not to sue
void as against public policy, and thus of no force? As we
answer this question in the negative, we will address an
additional question: (2) do the release and covenant not to sue
bar Wendel from being able to maintain an action under ERISA
§ 502(a)(2), as defendants urge?
A. ERISA § 410(a)
ERISA § 410(a) provides that “any provision in an
agreement or instrument which purports to relieve a fiduciary
from responsibility or liability for any responsibility, obligation,
or duty under this part shall be void as against public policy.”
29 U.S.C. § 1110(a). The District Court concluded that, in light
of this provision, “the release and covenant not to sue at issue
here do not extinguish Wendel’s claims and have no bearing on
the typicality inquiry.” (JA 31.) In reaching this conclusion, the
District Court relied on Baker v. Kingsley, No. 03-1750, 2007
WL 1597654, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 2007), where the district
court stated that “ERISA itself prohibits parties from waiving
claims for breaches of fiduciary duty,” and used this as an
alternative ground for rejecting a typicality challenge against
plaintiffs who had signed releases.
We disagree with the District Court’s application of
§ 410(a) to an individual release and covenant not to sue,
because we conclude that § 410 applies only to instruments that
purport to alter a fiduciary’s statutory duties and responsibilities,
- 12 -

whereas an individual release or covenant not to sue merely
settles an individual dispute without altering a fiduciary’s
statutory duties and responsibilities. We agree with the view of
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Leavitt v. Northwestern
Bell Telephone Co., 921 F.2d 160 (8th Cir. 1990):
In our view, a release is not an ‘agreement or
instrument’ within the meaning of section
1110(a). Section 1110(a) prohibits agreements
that diminish the statutory obligations of a
fiduciary. A release, however, does not relieve a
fiduciary of any responsibility, obligation, or duty
imposed by ERISA; instead, it merely settles a
dispute that the fiduciary did not fulfill its
responsibility or duty on a given occasion.
Id. at 161-62; see also Boeckman v. A.G. Edwards, Inc., 461 F.
Supp. 2d 801, 808 (S.D. Ill. 2006) (ERISA § 410(a) does not
create a “ blanket prohibition of the release of claims for breach
of fiduciary duty”).
Baker appears to be the only instance of a court’s
applying § 410(a) to invalidate an individual release. It is an
unreported opinion in which this appears as mere dicta with no
supporting reasoning. Leavitt and Boeckman are considerably
more persuasive. We adopt their reasoning and read § 410(a) to
extend only to contractual or other devices that purport to alter
the statutory obligations of a fiduciary under ERISA, and not to
- 13 -

reach a release of claims signed by an individual claiming the
breach of a fiduciary duty. Otherwise, individuals could never
amicably resolve litigation over these issues.
Accordingly, ERISA § 410(a) does not render Wendel’s
individual release and covenant not to sue void against public
policy, and the effect of her release, therefore, must be
considered.
B. Wendel’s Release as a Bar
Defendants contend that Wendel’s release is a bar to the
instant action. We disagree. Section 502(a)(2) claims are, by
their nature, plan claims. See, e.g., Graden v. Conexant Sys.,
Inc., 496 F.3d 291, 295 (3d Cir. 2007). Wendel’s complaint
frames her causes of action in terms of claims brought “on
behalf of” the Plan. Nowhere does she present the claims as
anything but causes of action that belong to the Plan and are
based on duties owed to the Plan. There is very little authority
suggesting that an individual who has signed a release is barred
from bringing claims under ERISA § 502(a)(2) on behalf of an
ERISA plan. Indeed, there appears to be only one case to have
so concluded. See Howell v. Motorola, Inc., No. 03-5044, 2005
WL 2420410, at *4-6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2005) (valid release
precludes § 502(a)(2) claim brought on behalf of a plan). The
vast majority of courts have concluded that an individual release
has no effect on an individual’s ability to bring a claim on behalf
of an ERISA plan under § 502(a)(2). See Bowles v. Reade, 198
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F.3d 752, 759-62 (9th Cir. 1999) (concluding that the plaintiff’s
§ 502(a)(2) claims on behalf of the plans were unaffected by her
release); Johnson v. Couturier, No. 05-2046, 2006 WL 2943160,
at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2006) (release does not preclude
§ 502(a)(2) action); In re JDS Uniphase Corp. ERISA Litig., No.
03-4743, 2006 WL 2597995, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2006)
(“The release . . . do[es] not bar ERISA fiduciary duty claims
brought by plan beneficiaries on behalf of the plan.”). Indeed,
a number of courts have held that, as a matter of law, an
individual cannot release the plan’s claims, and so for that
reason an individual release cannot bar an individual from
bringing a claim on behalf of an ERISA plan under ERISA
§ 502(a)(2). See, e.g., In re Aquila ERISA Litig., 237 F.R.D.
202, 210 (W.D. Mo. 2006) (“[T]he instant claims in this action
are brought on behalf of the Plan pursuant to ERISA
§ 502(a)(2), not by ERISA plan participants seeking individual
benefits. As a matter of law, a plan participant cannot release
the Plan’s claims.”); In re Williams Cos. ERISA Litig., 231
F.R.D. 416, 423 (N.D. Okla. 2005) (“[T]he Court notes that the
claims here are brought on behalf of the Plan, and a participant
cannot release the Plan’s claims, as a matter of law.”) (citation
omitted); In re Polaroid ERISA Litig., 240 F.R.D. 65, 75
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“[N]umerous courts have held that under
ERISA, individuals do not have the authority to release a . . .
plan’s right to recover for breaches of fiduciary duty.”).
Defendants urge that the issue turns on whether the
ERISA plan is a defined benefit plan or a defined contribution
- 15 -

plan.8 We disagree. Defined contribution ERISA plan claims
are no different in this regard from defined benefit ERISA plan
claims. In both cases, the ERISA § 502(a)(2) claim is brought
on behalf of the plan. There is no reason that an individual’s
ability to bring a § 502(a)(2) claim would differ depending on
whether the plan was a defined benefit plan or a defined
contribution plan, and no authority that suggests that such a
difference is or should be recognized.9 Moreover, district courts
8

A defined benefit plan is a pension plan under which an
employee receives a set monthly amount upon retirement for his
or her life, with the benefit amount typically based upon the
participant’s wages and length of service.
A defined
contribution plan is a retirement plan whereby the employer,
employee, or both make contributions to an individual’s account
during employment, but with no guaranteed retirement benefit,
and with the ultimate benefit based exclusively upon the
contributions to, and investment earnings of the plan. The
benefit ceases when the account balance is depleted, regardless
of the retiree’s age or circumstances. See ERISA §§ 3(34)-(35),
29 U.S.C. § 1002(34)-(35); P. Schneider & B. Freedman,
ERISA: A Comprehensive Guide § 3.02 (2d ed. 2003).
9

Contrary to defendants’ argument, the recent Supreme Court
decision in LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc., 128 S.
Ct. 1020, 552 U.S. 248 (2008), does not suggest otherwise.
LaRue involved a claim by a single participant in a defined
contribution plan, asserting that the trustees breached their
duties by failing to follow the participant’s investment
(continued...)
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have applied Bowles (which involved a defined benefit plan and
found that an individual release did not bar an individual from
bringing an ERISA § 502(a)(2) claim) to defined contribution
plans. See, e.g., In re Aquila ERISA Litig., 237 F.R.D. 202, 210
(W.D. Mo. 2006).
We conclude that Wendel’s release does not bar her from
bringing the § 502(a)(2) claim on behalf of the Plan.

9

(...continued)
directions. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals had held that
the plaintiff could not bring a claim under § 502(a)(2) because
the claim sought to protect the plaintiff’s individual rights,
rather than to protect the entire plan. Id. at 1023. The Supreme
Court vacated the order, after concluding that § 502(a)(2) claims
were available to redress fiduciary misconduct in defined
contribution plans, even though the relief may be individualized.
The Court stated that “whether a fiduciary breach diminishes
plan assets payable to all participants and beneficiaries, or only
to persons tied to particular individual accounts, it creates the
kind of harms” redressible under § 502(a)(2). Id. at 1025.
LaRue is of no help to defendants. First, it did not involve a
class action, nor did it involve an individual who has signed a
release or a covenant not to sue. Second, it broadens, rather than
limits, the relief available under § 502(a)(2) in holding that a
derivative fiduciary claim may be brought on behalf of a “plan,”
even if the ultimate relief may be individualized. Defendants’
contention that LaRue establishes that there are no “plan claims”
in the defined contribution context is incorrect.
- 17 -

Accordingly, we will consider whether class certification of the
claims, with Wendel as the sole proposed class representative,
was appropriate under Rule 23.
III.
Our review of a district court’s grant of class certification
is for “abuse of discretion, which occurs if the district court’s
decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant
conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.” In
re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 312 (3d
Cir. 2008) (internal quotation omitted).
It is well established that “[a] class may be certified only
if the court is ‘satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the
prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied.’” Beck v.
Maximus, 457 F.3d 291, 297 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Gen. Tel.
Co. Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982)). The requirements
“set out in Rule 23 are not mere pleading rules.” Hydrogen
Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 316. Unless each requirement of Rule 23
is actually met, a class cannot be certified. Id. at 320. As a
result, “[a]n overlap between a class certification requirement
and the merits of a claim is no reason to decline to resolve
relevant disputes when necessary to determine whether a class
certification requirement is met.” Id. at 316. Accordingly, we
have instructed district courts, where appropriate, to “‘delve
beyond the pleadings to determine whether the requirements for
class certification are satisfied.’” Id. at 316 (quoting Newton v.
- 18 -

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 167
(3d Cir. 2001)).
Rule 23(a) sets out four “prerequisites” for an individual
to be a class representative:
(1)

the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable;

(2)

there are questions of law or fact common
to the class;

(3)

the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses
of the class; and

(4)

the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the
class.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). These four requirements are referred to,
respectively, as “numerosity,” “commonality,” “typicality,” and
“adequacy.”
If all of these requirements are met, “a class of one of
three types (each with additional requirements) may be
certified.” Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 309. These three
types are set out in Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)-(3). Here, Plaintiff
- 19 -

sought certification under Rule 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2), and the
District Court certified the class under Rule 23(b)(1). Rule
23(b)(1) provides that a class action may be maintained if:
prosecuting separate actions by or against
individual class members would create a risk of .
. . adjudications with respect to individual class
members that, as a practical matter, would be
dispositive of the interests of the other members
not parties to the individual adjudications or
would substantially impair or impede their ability
to protect their interests.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1).
Because “each requirement of Rule 23 must be met, a
district court errs as a matter of law when it fails to resolve a
genuine legal or factual dispute relevant to determining the
requirements.” Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 320. Thus, in
reviewing the District Court’s decision to certify the class, we
must assess whether an adequately “rigorous analysis” was
conducted to determine that each of the Rule 23 requirements
was satisfied. Beck, 457 F.3d at 297.
A.
The first two Rule 23(a) prerequisites are plainly satisfied
here. Numerosity, the prerequisite that the class be so numerous
- 20 -

that joinder of all members is impracticable, is satisfied since
ERISA § 502(a)(2) claims are brought on behalf of a Plan, and
over 10,000 people were invested in the Schering-Plough Stock
Fund as of December 31, 2000.
Commonality is also clearly satisfied. Commonality
requires that “there are questions of law or fact common to the
class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). The threshold for establishing
commonality is straightforward: “The commonality requirement
will be satisfied if the named plaintiffs share at least one
question of fact or law with the grievances of the prospective
class.” Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3d Cir. 1994).10
The requirement of commonality is satisfied here. The
District Court, adopting the Report and Recommendation,
correctly found that there were many questions of law or fact
common to the named plaintiff and the class, including whether
defendants were fiduciaries; whether defendants breached their
duties to the Plan by failing to conduct an appropriate
investigation into the continued investment in Schering-Plough
stock; whether defendants breached their duties by continuing

10

It is well established that only one question of law or fact in
common is necessary to satisfy the commonality requirement,
despite the use of the plural “questions” in the language of Rule
23(a)(2). See, e.g., In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig.,
818 F.2d 145, 166-67 (2d Cir. 1987); Weiss v. York Hosp., 745
F.2d 786, 808-09 (3d Cir. 1984).
- 21 -

to invest in Schering-Plough stock and in continuing to offer the
Schering-Plough Stock Fund; whether the defendants in
supervisory roles failed in their monitoring of the Investment
Committee Defendants; whether defendants failed to retain
independent fiduciaries; and whether the Plan suffered losses as
a result of defendants’ breaches. These types of common
questions are sufficient to meet the commonality requirement in
ERISA cases. See Williams, 231 F.R.D. at 421 (finding
commonality satisfied when common questions included
whether defendants were fiduciaries and whether defendant
breached their fiduciary duties under ERISA); Polaroid, 224
F.R.D. at 74 (same); In re Elec. Data Sys. Corp. ERISA Litig.,
224 F.R.D. 613, 622 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (same).
B.
It is not as clear, however, that the other two Rule 23(a)
prerequisites—typicality and adequacy—are satisfied.
1. Typicality
Typicality requires that “the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). All four Rule 23(a)
prerequisites for class certification serve as “guideposts for
determining whether maintenance of a class action is
economical and whether the named plaintiff’s claim and the
class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class
- 22 -

members will be fairly and adequately protected in their
absence.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626
n.20 (1997) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
The typicality requirement furthers this aim by ensuring that the
class representatives are sufficiently similar to the rest of the
class—in terms of their legal claims, factual circumstances, and
stake in the litigation—so that certifying those individuals to
represent the class will be fair to the rest of the proposed class.
See, e.g., Newton, 259 F.3d at 182; Beck, 457 F.3d at 296; In re
Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig.,
55 F.3d 768, 785, 796 (3d Cir. 1995). Since one cannot assess
whether an individual is sufficiently similar to the class as a
whole without knowing something about both the individual and
the class, courts must consider the attributes of the proposed
representatives, the class as a whole, and the similarity between
the proposed representatives and the class. This investigation
properly focuses on the similarity of the legal theory and legal
claims; the similarity of the individual circumstances on which
those theories and claims are based; and the extent to which the
proposed representative may face significant unique or atypical
defenses to her claims. See, e.g., Newton, 259 F.3d at 183-85;
Beck, 457 F.3d at 295-97, 300-01.
The requirement that the legal theory and legal claims of
the proposed representative must be typical of those of the class
comes directly from the plain language of the Rule, which
requires that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed. R. Civ.
- 23 -

P. 23(a)(3). The similarity between claims or defenses of the
representative and those of the class does not have to be perfect.
Baby Neal, 43 F.3d at 56; Hassine v. Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169, 17778 (3d Cir. 1988). We have previously said that the named
plaintiffs’ claims must merely be “typical, in common-sense
terms, of the class, thus suggesting that the incentives of the
plaintiffs are aligned with those of the class.” Beck, 457 F.3d at
295-96.
The requirement that the individual factual circumstances
underlying the legal theory and legal claims of the representative
must be sufficiently similar to those of the class stems from
similar considerations. Ensuring that absent class members will
be fairly protected requires the claims and defenses of the
representative to be sufficiently similar not just in terms of their
legal form, but also in terms of their factual basis and support.
See, e.g., E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S.
395, 403-04 (1977). However, factual differences between the
proposed representative and other members of the class do not
render the representative atypical “if the claim arises from the
same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to the
claims of the class members.” Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson
& Co., 980 F.2d 912, 923 (3d Cir. 1992) (internal quotations
omitted). Complete factual similarity is not required; just
enough factual similarity so that maintaining the class action is
reasonably economical and the interests of the other class
members will be fairly and adequately protected in their
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absence. Newton, 259 F.3d at 182-85; Hassine, 846 F.2d at
176-77.
The requirement that the proposed representatives not be
subject to unique defenses can be seen as an offshoot of the
requirement that the representative have circumstances that are
sufficiently similar to those of the class. It is well established
that a proposed class representative is not “typical” under Rule
23(a)(3) if “the representative is subject to a unique defense that
is likely to become a major focus of the litigation.” Beck, 457
F.3d at 301. We have explained the rationale behind this
principle, noting that the “challenge presented by a defense
unique to a class representative” is that “the representative’s
interests might not be aligned with those of the class, and the
representative might devote time and effort to the defense at the
expense of issues that are common and controlling for the
class.” Beck, 457 F.3d at 297. Other courts of appeals have
emphasized this concern. See, e.g., Gary Plastic Packaging
Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d
176, 180 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[T]here is a danger that absent class
members will suffer if their representative is preoccupied with
defenses unique to it.”); Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d
497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992) (same); J.H. Cohn & Co. v. Am.
Appraisal Assocs., 628 F.2d 994, 999 (7th Cir. 1980) (“[T]he
presence of even an arguable defense peculiar to the named
plaintiff or a small subset of the plaintiff class may destroy the
required typicality of the class . . . The fear is that the named
plaintiff will become distracted by the presence of a possible
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defense applicable only to him so that the representation of the
rest of the class will suffer.” (internal citations omitted)).
A common thread running through the various
components of typicality—the requirements of similarity of
legal claims, factual similarity, and absence of defenses unique
to the representative—is the interest in ensuring that the class
representative’s interests and incentives will be generally
aligned with those of the class as a whole. See, e.g., Amchem,
521 U.S. at 626 n.20 (noting that “the interests of the class
members will be fairly and adequately protected” if the
representative’s claims are adequately interrelated); Beck, 457
F.3d at 295-96 (stating that the typicality requirement helps to
ensure that “the incentives of the plaintiffs are aligned with
those of the class”); Stewart v. Abraham, 275 F.3d 220, 227 (3d
Cir. 2001) (“The typicality inquiry centers on whether the
interests of the named plaintiffs align with the interests of the
absent members.”).
From the foregoing we glean the proper consideration in
assessing typicality to include three distinct, though related,
concerns: (1) the claims of the class representative must be
generally the same as those of the class in terms of both (a) the
legal theory advanced and (b) the factual circumstances
underlying that theory; (2) the class representative must not be
subject to a defense that is both inapplicable to many members
of the class and likely to become a major focus of the litigation;
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and (3) the interests and incentives of the representative must
be sufficiently aligned with those of the class.11
2. Wendel’s Typicality
Here, there is no doubt that as an individual bringing a
claim under ERISA § 502(a)(2), Wendel satisfies the first of
these conditions. Her legal claims, alleging several breaches of
fiduciary duty, are identical to those of the class she seeks to
represent. The basic factual circumstances supporting those
claims—namely, defendants’ conduct, Wendel’s participation in
the Plan, and her investment in Schering-Plough stock—are
shared by the rest of the proposed class. Indeed, the class is
defined so as to ensure this, requiring all class members to be
“participants in or beneficiaries of the Schering-Plough
Corporation Employees’ Savings Plan at any time between
11

The Report and Recommendation noted that “[t]he proper
focus of a typicality analysis is on defendants’ conduct and
plaintiff’s legal theories,” and suggested that in an ERISA
§ 502(a)(2) case, “class certification should be almost
automatic.” (Joint App. 13.) The nature of ERISA § 502(a)(2)
claims does mean that commonality is quite likely to be
satisfied, so that the first part of the typicality
requirement—similarity of legal claims and the factual basis
supporting those claims—will generally be satisfied. But, as
this case demonstrates, that does not mean that class
certification is automatic. The other aspects of typicality, as
well as adequacy, must be considered.
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July 29, 1998 to the present and whose accounts included
investments in Schering stock.”
It is not at all clear, however, that Wendel satisfies either
of the other two conditions of typicality. First, as noted above,
Wendel signed a Separation Agreement that included a general
release and a covenant not to sue. As a result, she may be
subject to unique defenses that could become a focus of the
litigation, rendering her atypical and making class certification
inappropriate. For instance, even if a release does not bar an
individual from bringing an ERISA § 502(a)(2) claim on behalf
of a plan, it could be argued that the covenant not to sue bars
Wendel from filing a lawsuit and serving as a lead plaintiff in an
action against Schering-Plough. Second, it could be argued that
because of this release and covenant not to sue, Wendel’s
interests and incentives may not be sufficiently aligned with
those of the class.12 Given her release, Wendel may not have a
monetary stake in the outcome. We do not decide these issues.
As the District Court did not consider the release to be valid, it

12

It is worth noting that we agree with the District Court that
Wendel’s deposition testimony does not preclude her from
acting as a class representative for the Plan. As noted in the
Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, the
testimony that defendants allege demonstrates a clear conflict of
interest is “subject to varying interpretations and does not reflect
any clear conflict.” (Joint App. 14.)
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did not delve into these aspects of her representation of the
class. It must do so on remand.
In addition, no conclusion as to Wendel’s typicality can
be reached without knowing more about the composition of the
class and, in particular, whether other members of the class have
signed releases and covenants not to sue. As noted above, the
typicality requirement is meant to ensure that class
representatives are sufficiently similar to the rest of the
class—in terms of their legal claims, factual circumstances, and
stake in the litigation. Currently, we know nothing about the
other members of the class, and, specifically, we know nothing
about how many of them have signed releases or covenants not
to sue. Given the above concerns about Wendel’s typicality,
additional inquiry is required into the factual circumstances of
the members of the class and whether her release and covenant
not to sue render her atypical.
Here, we do not decide these issues but only require that
the District Court conduct a more “rigorous analysis” into the
effect of Wendel’s release and covenant not to sue and the
extent to which other members of the class have signed similar
agreements.13 As stressed above, a class may be certified only

13

In this, our posture is similar to that of the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit in Langbecker v. Electronic Data Systems
Corp., 476 F.3d 299, 313 (5th Cir. 2007). In Langbecker, a
(continued...)
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after a rigorous analysis has been conducted to determine
whether the prerequisites of Rule 23 have been satisfied. As a
result, “[a]n overlap between a class certification requirement
and the merits of a claim is no reason to decline to resolve
relevant disputes when necessary to determine whether a class

13

(...continued)
district court certified a class in which up to 9,000 potential
class members in a § 502(a)(2) claim had signed broad releases.
Id. at 313. A divided panel remanded the matter for further
consideration of the effect of the releases on the certification
decision. The court of appeals acknowledged that “§ 502(a)(2)
allows recovery that inures to the benefit of the plan as a remedy
for breach of fiduciary duties.” Id. The court also stated that the
“enforceability of the releases presents difficult questions,” and
the “impact of the releases should not have been excluded from
the district court’s certification analysis.” Id. The Fifth Circuit
was clear, however, that “we are not holding that the releases
foreclose any § 502(a)(2) suit on behalf of the Plan or foreclose
any class certification. We do stress, however, that the status of
perhaps nine thousand claimants is not a trifle—either to the
Appellants or the claimants themselves. The district court must
consider the releases more thoroughly on remand.” Id.
Our position is similar in that we agree that the release
does not foreclose Wendel’s § 502(a)(2) suit on behalf of the
Plan, but we do see the release and covenant not to sue as
relevant concerns for class certification and in particular for
satisfying the typicality and adequacy requirements.
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certification requirement is met.” Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d
at 316.14

14

As we discuss more fully below, we disagree with the notion
set forth in the Report and Recommendation that “[t]he Court
must accept the substantive allegations of the complaint as true,”
citing Chiang v. Veneman, 385 F.3d 256, 262 (3d Cir. 2004).
(Joint App. 5.) As Hydrogen Peroxide makes clear, and as we
note below, Chiang is mistaken on this point. Hydrogen
Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 318 n.18. Additionally, the Report and
Recommendation invokes Eisenberg v. Gagnon for the
proposition that “[u]ltimately, doubts are resolved in favor of
class certification.” (Joint App. 6) (citing Eisenberg, 766 F.2d
770, 785 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 342, 343
(1985)). Our decision in Hydrogen Peroxide makes clear that
Eisenberg should not be read in this manner:
Although the trial court has discretion to grant or
deny class certification, the court should not
suppress “doubt” as to whether a Rule 23
requirement is met—no matter the area of
substantive law. Accordingly, Eisenberg should
not be understood to encourage certification in the
face of doubt as to whether a Rule 23 requirement
has been met. Eisenberg predates the recent
amendments to Rule 23 which, as noted, reject
tentative decisions on certification and encourage
development of a record sufficient for informed
analysis.
(continued...)
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We note that there have been situations in which a class
representative has been deemed atypical for having not signed
a release when other members of the class have signed
releases.15 And there have been cases in which a class was
certified despite there being either (1) class representatives
without releases representing a class that included people with
releases;16 or (2) ‘mixed’ class representatives (some but not all

14

(...continued)
Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 321.
15

In Melong, class certification was denied because the
representatives, who had not signed releases, were found
atypical and inadequate as representatives of a class that
included people who had signed releases.
Melong v.
Micronesian Claims Comm’n, 643 F.2d 10 (D.C. Cir. 1980). In
that case, 7200 of 7500 members of the class had signed
releases, making it only a very small minority of class members
who were in the same situation as the proposed representatives.

16

There are a number of cases in which a class was certified
in the context of a ERISA § 502(a)(2) claim being brought for
breach of fiduciary duties in managing a defined contribution
plan, despite the fact that the class representatives had not
signed releases whereas some members of the proposed class
had signed releases. See, e.g., George v. Kraft Foods Global,
Inc., 251 F.R.D. 338 (N.D. Ill. 2008); Williams, 231 F.R.D. 416.
In the latter case, a class was certified, but the district court
(continued...)
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of whom signed releases), representing a ‘mixed’ class (some
who had signed releases, some who had not).17 We have not
found a single case in which a class was certified where the only
proposed representative signed a release and a covenant not to
sue and then attempted to represent a class consisting primarily
of members who had not signed releases or covenants not to sue.
16

(...continued)
required the plaintiffs to provide a class member to represent
those with releases in order to satisfy typicality and to address
any potential standing worries. Id. at 423-24. In limited
contrast, in Langbecker, the Fifth Circuit vacated a class
certification order in a similar ERISA § 502(a)(2) claim partially
on the ground that the class representatives had not signed
releases whereas 9000 of the 85,000 proposed class members
had signed releases, and the district court excluded consideration
of the releases from its certification analysis. Langbecker, 476
F.3d at 313-15. However, the Fifth Circuit did not find that the
class representatives were atypical because of the releases—only
that this should have been considered by the district court.
17

There are cases in which a ‘mixed’ set of class
representatives (including people who had signed releases and
people who had not) was deemed typical and adequate to
represent a ‘mixed’ class. See, e.g., In re Aquila ERISA Litig.,
237 F.R.D. 202 (W.D. Mo. 2006). In that case, the district court
said that the issue of releases should be addressed later, noting
that the parties were free “to litigate that issue [the releases] and
request decertification of class members who signed the
releases” at a later point if necessary. Id. at 210-11.
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3. Adequacy
The final Rule 23(a) class certification prerequisite, Rule
23(a)(4), requires that “the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(a)(4). The adequacy inquiry “has two components designed
to ensure that absentees’ interests are fully pursued.” See
Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 630 (3d Cir.
1996), aff’d, Amchem, 521 U.S. 591. First, the adequacy inquiry
“tests the qualifications of the counsel to represent the class.”
In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 532 (3d
Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted). No issue has been raised
regarding the adequacy of Wendel’s counsel for purposes of
representing the class.
The second component of the adequacy inquiry seeks “to
uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the
class they seek to represent.” Id. There are clear similarities
between the components of the typicality inquiry relating to the
absence of unique defenses and alignment of interests, and this
second part of the adequacy inquiry that focuses on possible
conflicts of interest. “Because of the similarity of [the typicality
and adequacy] inquiries, certain questions—like whether a
unique defense should defeat class certification—are relevant
under both.” Beck, 457 F.3d at 296.
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For this reason, many of the same questions regarding
Wendel’s typicality also raise issues as to her adequacy. For
example, if some or most members of the class do not have
releases or covenants not to sue, then Wendel may be subject to
a unique defense. If Wendel’s release is held to bar her recovery
in the form of individualized augmented benefits, she may lack
the same financial stake as the other members of the class.
Also, Wendel may have different incentives in terms of how
much time, energy, and money she is willing to spend pursuing
the claim. See, e.g., In re Bell S. Corp. ERISA Litig., No. 02CV-2440, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46823 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 30,
2005) (finding named plaintiffs inadequate class representatives
because of, among other reasons, signed releases: “the Named
Plaintiffs who signed such releases clearly cannot bring claims
on behalf of the class with the same vigor and interest as
someone who had not signed such releases”). Therefore, for the
reasons articulated above, the District Court must give further
consideration to the interests of the members of the class, and
the impact of the release and covenant not to sue, as bearing on
Wendel’s ability to be an adequate class representative.
C.
Defendants also challenge the temporal scope of the
class, contending that the District Court erred in granting an
open-ended class period that extends from July 29, 1998 to the
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“present,” 18 and in concluding that it was bound to credit
Wendel’s assertion that defendants continue to act imprudently
with regard to Schering-Plough stock. They urge that, under the
proper standard in this Circuit, the District Court had a duty to
go behind the pleadings to determine the appropriate class
period. We agree. This issue is dispositive, and so we do not
reach defendants’ other arguments regarding the open-ended
class period.
In the Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge
correctly noted that Wendel alleged in her complaint that
Schering-Plough stock is an imprudent investment up to the
present.19 (Joint App. 23.) He also cited decisions of other

18

On September 30, 2008, the District Court ordered the
following class to be certified:
All persons who were participants in or
beneficiaries of the Schering-Plough Corporation
Employees’ Savings Plan at any time between
July 29, 1998 to the present and whose accounts
included investments in Schering stock[.]
(Joint App. 35.)
19

The complaint was filed on March 30, 2006. (Joint App.
124.)
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district courts 20 demonstrating that the correct class period in an
ERISA prudence claim extends to the date at which the stock
ceased to be an imprudent investment, and reasoned that, since
discovery had not yet commenced, he would accept the class
period as alleged, “subject to potential future modification.”
(Joint App. 23-24.) The District Court adopted the Report and
Recommendation, and cited Chiang, 385 F.3d at 262, for the
proposition that it was “constrained to accept the substantive
allegations of the complaint as true,” in the absence of evidence
that the investment was imprudent by 2001. (Joint App. 33.) In
Chiang, we rejected arguments raised by a defendant that a
certified class definition was “overbroad,” reasoning that
because certain issues affecting class definition went to the
merits of the case, they could not appropriately be resolved at
the class certification stage. 385 F.3d at 269-70.
Chiang misstated the law on this point, and has been
disavowed in more recent decisions. In Hydrogen Peroxide, we
explained:
Chiang v. Veneman, 385 F.3d 256, 262 (3d Cir.
2004), decided after Newton and Johnston, cited

20

E.g., Lively v. Dynegy, Inc., No. 05-00063, 2007 WL
685861 at *6 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 2007) (“Accordingly, the proper
termination date of the proposed class period is the date when
Dynegy stock ceased to be, as Plaintiffs allege, an imprudent
investment for the Plan.”).
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Eisen for the proposition that “in determining
whether a class will be certified, the substantive
allegations of the complaint must be taken as
true.” No supporting analysis of Rule 23
jurisprudence accompanied this statement, which
contradicts and conflicts with Newton, Johnston,
and Szabo (which we relied upon in Newton).
“To the extent that the decision of a later panel
conflicts with existing circuit precedent, we are
bound by the earlier, not the later, decision.”
United States v. Monaco, 23 F.3d 793, 803 (3d
Cir. 1994).
552 F.3d at 318 n.18.
In Hydrogen Peroxide we stressed that the decision to
certify and define a class requires a “rigorous analysis” that
“may include a preliminary inquiry into the merits.” Id. at 318
(internal quotation marks omitted). The District Court’s
acceptance of Wendel’s allegations without such inquiry in
reliance on Chiang, and its resulting certification of an openended class period, constituted an abuse of its discretion. The
District Court should reconsider the class period on remand
under the correct legal standard, which may require the District
Court to engage in preliminary factual inquiries on the merits in
order to resolve questions pertaining to the appropriate end date.
We note, however, that nothing in Hydrogen Peroxide should be
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read to preclude an open-ended class period, as long as the
period results from a proper application of law.
D.
Defendants’ last argument is that Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class
certification was inappropriate here because they may assert a
statutory defense under ERISA § 404(c), and the applicability of
that defense must be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Section 404(c) provides a defense to a breach of fiduciary duty
claim if the loss caused by the breach resulted from a
participant’s exercise of control.21 Defendants argue that a
“judicial determination applying the § 404(c) defense against
one plan participant would not be dispositive of whether the
defense applies against any other participant.” Appellants’
21

ERISA § 404(c) provides in pertinent part that:
In the case of a pension plan which provides for
individual accounts and permits a participant or
beneficiary to exercise control over the assets in
his account, if a participant or beneficiary
exercises control over the assets in his account . .
. no person who is otherwise a fiduciary shall be
liable under this part for any loss, or by reason of
any breach, which results from such participant’s
or beneficiary’s exercise of control . . . .

29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1)(A).
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Br. 41. Thus, the § 404(c) defense raises “individualized issues
regarding each participant’s decision to invest in the Stock
Fund,” and defendants contend that “[b]ecause the resolution of
these questions for any one participant will not be determinative
of the claims of any other participant, certification of a Rule
23(b)(1)(B) class was inappropriate.” Id. at 50.
The problem with this argument is that it confuses the
requirements for certification of a Rule 23(b)(1) class with the
requirements for class certification under Rule 23(b)(3). Under
Rule 23(b)(3), the Court must find that “questions of law or fact
common to class members predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members” and that “a class action is
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). This
gives rise to the requirements of predominance and superiority.
Under the District Court’s Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class
certification, however, there is no predominance or superiority
requirement. Rather, a class should be certified under Rule
23(b)(1)(B) when “prosecuting separate actions by or against
individual class members would create a risk of . . .
adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as
a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the
other members not parties to the individual adjudications or
would substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their
interests.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B). This is clearly the case
here, where Wendel’s proofs regarding defendants’ conduct
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will, as a practical matter, significantly impact the claims of
other Plan participants and of employees who invested in the
Stock Fund. Wendel’s claims are based on defendants’ conduct,
not, as defendants urge, on unique facts and individual
relationships.
In light of the derivative nature of ERISA § 502(a)(2)
claims, breach of fiduciary duty claims brought under
§ 502(a)(2) are paradigmatic examples of claims appropriate for
certification as a Rule 23(b)(1) class, as numerous courts have
held.22 See, e.g., Kolar v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 01-CV-1229,
2003 WL 1257272, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2003); In re Ikon
Office Solutions, Inc., 191 F.R.D. 457, 467 (E.D. Pa. 2000); In
re Global Crossing Ltd. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 225 F.R.D. 436,
453 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Jones v. NovaStar Fin., Inc., 2009 WL
943563 at *12 (W.D. Mo. 2009). Given this, it is simply not
relevant to the Rule 23(b)(1)(B) inquiry that “the attempt to
establish a § 404(c) defense will invariably” present individual
issues, as defendants argue. Appellants’ Br. 41. What is
relevant here is that the plaintiff’s claims about defendants’
conduct are sufficiently similar to those of the proposed class
and are not based on “unique facts” and “individual
relationships with the defendants.” Given that it is an ERISA
§ 502(a)(2) claim brought on behalf of the Plan and alleging
breaches of fiduciary duty on the part of defendants that will, if
22

For reasons articulated in footnote 9 above, the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in LaRue does not suggest otherwise.
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true, be the same with respect to every class member, Rule
23(b)(1)(B) is clearly satisfied, and the § 404(c) defense is not
relevant.
Therefore, we need not consider the § 404(c) issue at this
juncture. In so concluding, we do not mean to imply that the
§ 404(c) defense would necessarily be problematic under Rule
23(b)(3), or that it necessarily applies with respect to Wendel or
more generally in ERISA cases of this sort.23
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will VACATE the class
certification order and REMAND for proceedings consistent
with this Opinion.

23

Wendel contends that under Department of Labor
regulations, § 404(c) does not provide a defense to the fiduciary
duty claims she is asserting. See 57 Fed. Reg. 46906, 46922
(Oct. 13, 1992) (“The Department emphasizes, however, that the
act of designating investment alternatives . . . in an ERISA
section 404(c) plan is a fiduciary function to which the
limitation on liability provided by section 404(c) is not
applicable.”). We need not reach these issues and do not decide
them.
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